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Abstract
The fact that genes and environment contribute differentially to variation in hu-
man behaviors, traits and attitudes is central to the field of behavior genetics. Per-
ceptions about these differential contributions may affect ideas about human agency.
We surveyed two independent samples (N = 301 and N = 740) to assess beliefs about
free will, determinism, political orientation, and the relative contribution of genes
and environment to 21 human traits. We find that lay estimates of genetic influence
on these traits cluster into four distinct groups, which differentially predict beliefs
about human agency, political orientation, and religiosity. Despite apparent ideolog-
ical associations with these beliefs, the correspondence between mean lay estimates
and published heritability estimates for the surveyed traits is large (r = .77). Belief
in genetic determinism emerges as a modest predictor of accuracy in these lay esti-
mates. Additionally, educated mothers with multiple children emerge as particularly
accurate in their estimates of the genetic contribution to these traits.
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1 Introduction
The problem of free will is one of the oldest in philosophy. Our intuitive sense that
we have the capacity to decide between two or more alternative courses of action
has provoked a diversity of interpretations. This is unsurprising because of the con-
nections between our intuitive sense of free will and concepts of moral responsibility,
just reward, individual autonomy and dignity, genuine love or friendship (O’Connor,
2016), often in conjunction with social identity or specific religious beliefs (Baumeis-
ter, Bauer, & Lloyd, 2010). Enlightenment-era Scottish philosopher David Hume is
largely responsible for crystallizing the issue of free will into two primary positions:
Compatibilism, which posits that a deterministic universe is consistent with freedom
of choice, and incompatibilism, which holds that determinism and free will are in-
herently at odds (Hume, 1975/1738). Within this framing, the question of free will
is concentrated on whether we have a particular kind of causal control of our deci-
sions and actions. Hume’s conviction that free will and determinism are ultimately
compatible has been interpreted in different ways, but one of the most straightfor-
ward interpretations hinges on Hume’s definitions of “liberty” and “necessity”. If
free and responsible action must necessarily be caused by an agent, then it must
be compatible with a deterministic basis for cause and effect (Russell, 2016; Hume,
1975/1738).
The psychologist William James, by contrast, famously called compatibilism “a
quagmire of evasion” and struggled for much of his life to reconcile his understanding
of a law-governed, deterministic universe with the subjective experience of having free
will (James, 1956/1884). Despite developments in our understanding of determinism
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(Earman, 1986; Ismael, 2016) and a rich set of distinctions that reveal a complex set of
phenomena associated with our intuitive sense of free choice (Kane, 2002; O’Connor,
2016), a number of contemporary researchers have questioned whether we have free
will at all (compatibilist or incompatibilist). Empirical studies in neuroscience and
cognitive psychology have been central to this line of questioning. Experiments de-
signed to ascertain the relationship between our awareness of a conscious decision
and the brain activity involved in carrying out an associated physical action seem to
suggest that we do not have conscious control of the initiation of our actions and our
impression that we do is illusory (Libet, 1985). However, there is little consensus on
how to interpret these experiments (Mele, 2009).
“Experimental philosophy” has emerged recently as a field of inquiry that seeks,
among other things, to understand whether and to what extent the intuitions of
everyday people align with those used by philosophers to formulate key distinctions,
such as compatibilism versus incompatibilism. The field makes use of empirical data
and experimental methods to investigate regularities and variation in the attitudes
and behaviors of everyday people to shed light on the psychological processes and
experiential circumstances that predict beliefs and interpretations about key con-
cepts. Some of its findings have been surprising. On a number of the issues that
have been investigated, lay intuitions conform poorly to the space of possibilities
formulated within traditional philosophy. Several studies have found that individ-
ual differences in personality predict philosophical disagreement to a surprisingly
large extent, prompting some researchers to speculate that the heritability of these
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traits may help explain the persistence of unresolved philosophical disputes (Feltz &
Cokely, 2012).
Free will has been a salient topic in these endeavors. For example, experimental
philosophers have asked questions about the relationship between moral responsibil-
ity and free will by surveying the general public on what they actually believe (Nah-
mias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005), or by seeing whether these beliefs show
significant differences in culture (Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001) or even gender
(Adleberg, Thompson, & Nahmias, 2014). Although these studies have illuminated
important patterns in how people conceptualize free will under certain conditions
and change their conception in light of specific factors, no unifying perspective has
been identified. The empirical evidence does not provide unqualified endorsement of
whether most people adopt compatibilist or incompatibilist orientations to the con-
cept of free will (Chan, Deutsch, & Nichols, 2016), or even whether this distinction
is relevant to what most people believe about free will and determinism.
While psychology and philosophy have been wrestling with the concept of free
will for centuries and millennia (respectively), behavior genetics provides a novel
approach that can address questions about how people perceive free will and what
factors contribute to their perceptions. Implicit in traditional debates about “nature
vs. nurture” is the empirical finding that features of our biological constitution and
features of our social and developmental experience make differential contributions to
human behavior (Tabery, 2014). Studies of monozygotic twins—a standard method-
ology utilized in behavior genetics—have shown for decades that twins can exhibit
uncanny similarities as a direct consequence of genetic similarity. These studies also
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tend to engender a fascination with free will and determinism, especially as misun-
derstandings about the nature and meaning of heritability are thought to sometimes
foster maladaptive social attitudes (Gericke et al., 2017). Intriguingly, the relation-
ship between our intuitions about free will and knowledge about the heritability of
human traits has remained largely unstudied. For example, on the standard framing
of compatibilism versus incompatibilism, a deterministic universe would have the
same logical implications for free will regardless of whether genes or environment
are more responsible for determining our behavior. And yet it seems plausible that
people might have different intuitions about how these types of causal factors are
related to the concept of free will.
Perhaps just as interesting is the fact that the small number of existing stud-
ies on attitudes about genetic determinism have generally considered only magni-
tude rather than accuracy of these estimations. When examined through the lens
of modern behavior genetic findings, multiple meta-analyses and other large-scale
twin studies present the opportunity for comparing lay estimates of genetic contri-
butions to different human traits with their empirical heritability estimates. Various
public surveys have been conducted to assess lay knowledge about genetics (e.g.,
Carver, Caste´ra, Gericke, Evangelista, and El-Hani, 2017), but have not examined
individual differences in accuracy in the context of causes and consequences of ge-
netic determinism or empirical heritability estimates. Conversely, J. Keller’s Genetic
Determinism Scale (Keller, 2005) characterizes high scores on genetic determinism as
being associated with “prejudice and in-group bias”, but does not consider whether
different estimates could be considered a more or less accurate way of viewing real-
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ity. The existing literature has also left open the question of other potential causes
and consequences of more or less accurate perceptions of the genetic contribution to
different traits in everyday life. While existing research indicates that laypeople do
incorporate knowledge about genetics into their understanding of human behaviors
and motives (Condit, Parrott, & Harris, 2006), little is known about the factors that
influence the accuracy of an individual’s perception. For example, is the tendency
to ascribe an accurate balance of genetic and environmental influence to various be-
haviors something that can be learned over time, or is this capacity itself innate? Is
general accuracy associated with variables other than education about genetics? In
a recent study of primary school teachers in the United Kingdom and their beliefs
about the influence of genetic and environmental factors on educationally relevant
traits, more accurate beliefs were found to be modestly associated with having taught
older children (Crosswaite & Asbury, 2019), providing a tantalizing but limited sug-
gestion that experience may in part guide accuracy about perceptions of the role of
genetics in human behavior.
These unexplored questions suggest that an approach informed by findings from
behavior genetics is uniquely equipped to answer two important questions. First, how
do attitudes about free will and determinism relate to what people believe about the
genetic and environmental contributions to human behavior, and how well do these
beliefs align with empirical findings from published heritability estimates? Second,
what influences do genetic and environmental factors actually have on beliefs about
free will and determinism?
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The present study explores answers to the first question by surveying two inde-
pendent samples of participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk on several existing
measures of belief in free will and determinism, political orientation, religiosity, and
a suite of demographic questions including years of education, age, number of chil-
dren, and marital status. Of particular interest is whether and to what extent beliefs
about free will and determinism, including on novel subscales that discriminate be-
tween genetic and environmental determinism, relate to lay estimates of the genetic
and environmental contributions to 21 human traits. These include both physical
and psychological traits in both abnormal and normal dimensions, such as height,
schizophrenia, intelligence, and sexual orientation. The intention of surveying these
judgments is to ascertain how individuals with little or no genetics education perceive
the relative contribution of genes and environment to individual differences in these
traits, and how these judgments relate to other measured variables. This positions us
to probe questions about the formation and consequences of these beliefs, as well as
to ascertain how accurately lay estimates of genetic influence on these traits reflect
published estimates from meta-analyses and large-scale twin studies. For example, do
people tend to ascribe consistently different proportions of genetic and environmen-
tal influence to different types of traits; e.g., behavioral versus physical, or normal
versus abnormal? Some of the answers to these questions are predicted to be infor-
mative in addressing the second question, which is currently under investigation in
a large sample of adopted siblings from the Minnesota Center for Twin and Family
Research.
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2 Methods
2.1 Sample and demographics
Amazon Mechanical Turk was used for recruiting subjects to complete an online
questionnaire for monetary compensation in two studies across several weeks. Me-
chanical Turk (MTurk) is an open online marketplace where participants (“workers”)
can choose to complete a “human intelligence task” (HIT), which has been created by
businesses or researchers (“requesters”), using an online platform for data collection
and compensation. MTurk has been found to produce social science data that are at
least as reliable as those obtained through traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang,
& Gosling, 2011). Data quality can be further enhanced by restricting and filtering
on certain criteria, as more rigorous exclusion methods for MTurk samples have been
found to bolster statistical power (Thomas & Clifford, 2017). In the present study,
response validity was optimized by requiring participants to have completed at least
100 previous HITs on MTurk, at least 90% of which must have been approved as
valid by the HIT’s requester. This helps to ensure that all participants have a req-
uisite amount of valid experience using MTurk. Participants had to be at least 18
years old and located in the United States.
Data collection was initiated originally as a pilot study to help clarify the util-
ity of different free will and determinism scales, including both novel measures of
attitudes about genetic contributions to behavioral traits and the relationships of
these to demographic and personality criteria (see “Measures”), in order to vali-
date these measures for possible use in a subsequent adoption study. This initial
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sample recruited approximately 300 participants via MTurk and these participants
were surveyed on all measures reported in the current study. A larger second sample
of approximately 800 participants was recruited subsequently through MTurk, and
this sample was surveyed only on the “lay estimates of genetic influence on traits”
(see “LEGIT” under “Measures”) and the demographic items. The rationale for the
larger but truncated second sample is twofold: First, a larger number of participants
was thought to be useful for examining the internal patterns and relationships of the
novel LEGIT items at higher resolution while requiring each participant to spend
relatively little time answering the items. Second, the recruitment of an additional
sample enabled us to make one change in a demographic question to ask the number
of children, rather than just whether or not each participant has children.
The recruitment method and required criteria were identical across both sam-
ples. The randomly-assigned identifier number matched across both samples for to-
tal of 68 participants, and these individuals’ responses on the second survey were
removed from the final analyses, netting a total of 1041 unique participants across
both samples. The initial sample (Sample 1) consisted of 301 unique participants
(42.9% female) with 50.8% falling within the “25 to 34” age range. The second sam-
ple (Sample 2) consisted of 740 unique participants (48.2% female) with 46.2% falling
within the “25 to 34” age range. Both samples responded to a demographic section
that assessed age range, gender, marital status, educational degree, years of educa-
tion, working status, approximate number of hours worked in a week, and political
views. The demographic portion of the survey administered to Sample 2 included ad-
ditional questions on the range of household income and the number of children for
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each participant. Demographic distributions were similar for most variables across
the two samples. Frequency data for each demographic criterion is summarized for
both samples in Table 1.
A Chi-square test of independence was performed across samples for each demo-
graphic criterion listed in Table 1 that was shared across samples. In cases where bins
contained very few participant responses (e.g., “other” for gender), the Chi-square
test was repeated without inclusion of the small bin(s). The response frequencies for
each criterion were non-significantly different across the two samples, though “Do
you have children? (yes/no)” was marginal (χ2(1) = 6.42, p = .011), reflecting the
greater percentage to report having children in Sample 2 (44.3%) than in Sample 1
(35.3%).
2.2 Measures
In addition to the demographic questions described above, Sample 1 (N = 301)
evaluated participants on a total of 184 questions assessing beliefs about the causes of
human behavior, personality, religion, knowledge of basic genetics, attitudes toward
current affairs, and beliefs about the genetic and environmental contributions to
variation in 21 human traits. Sample 2 (N = 740) evaluated participants only on
beliefs about contributions to variation in the same 21 traits in addition to the
demographic questions. All scales used are described in the next section.
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2.2.1 Free will and determinism scales
Participants in Sample 1 answered a series of 69 questions on their opinions about the
causes of human behavior. Questions were extracted from two well-known measures
of human agency. Descriptive statistics for all measures of free will and determinism
used in Sample 1 (N = 301) are shown in Table 2, along with comparisons of alpha
reliability between published scales and the altered or truncated scales in the current
sample. Sample reliability for each scale and subscale generally compared favorably
to full-length, published alphas. Mean scores for each scale are constructed from
the same 5-point Likert scale. Alpha reliabilities for all scales were robust, generally
meeting or exceeding published alphas where available.
The Free Will and Determinism Scale-Plus (FAD+; Paulhus and Carey, 2011) is
one of the most widely used self-report measures of free will/determinism. It consists
of 27 items on 4 subscales: (1) Free Will (FW; 7 items, alpha = .70), (2) Scientific
Determinism (SD; 7 items, alpha = .69), (3) Fatalistic Determinism (FD; 5 items,
alpha = .82), and (4) Unpredictability (UNP; 8 items, alpha = .72). The scales are
minimally intercorrelated (all r < .20 in absolute value) and related to the Big Five
(largest r is between Neuroticism and Fatalistic Determinism, r = .22, p < .01;
see Table 4 of Paulhus and Carey 2011). Paulhus and Carey’s Scientific Determin-
ism scale includes two items concerning genetic/biological determinism (SD-BIO),
two items concerning environmental/psychosocial determinism (SD-ENV), and three
items concerning general determinism (SD-GEN). We have added nine new items
(three for SD-BIO, three for SD-ENV, and two for SD-GEN) to create three 5-item
subscales. In generating the items, we have attempted to make the Genetic and Envi-
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ronmental subscales as parallel as possible by mirroring the wording of the questions
closely. For example, a new item added for SD-BIO, “The genes you inherit will de-
termine your success as an adult”, is formulated as a direct parallel to the preexisting
Paulhus and Carey (2011) SD-ENV item: “Childhood environment will determine
your success as an adult”. The current study represents the first pilot testing of these
new items. Alpha reliabilities for the new 5-item subscales in the pilot sample are
shown in Table 2. All items are keyed positively, and responses are given on a 5-point
scale with each point anchored (Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree = 2, Neither agree
nor disagree = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly Agree = 5).
The Free Will Inventory (FWI; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripadad, and
Rosse, 2014) consists of three 5-item scales: (1) Free Will (FW), (2) Determinism
(DET), and (3) Dualism/Anti-Reductionism, which was not used in the final survey.
Our sample yielded an alpha reliability of .87 and .82 for FW and DET, respectively.
All items are keyed and anchored identically to the FAD+ items.
The Belief in Genetic Determinism scale (BGD; Keller, 2005) consists of 18 items
in its full scale; we chose to include the 10 with the highest factor loadings in order
to make it as parallel as possible to the Belief in Social Determinism scale so that
one view of determinism (environmental/social versus biological/genetic) would not
be over- or underrepresented in the number of items included in the survey. Our
10-item truncated scale produced an alpha reliability of .85 (Table 2). All items are
scored on a 5-point “agreement/disagreement” scale.
The Belief in Social Determinism scale (BSD; Rangel and Keller, 2011) consists
of 12 items in its full scale; again, we have chosen to include the 10 with the highest
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factor loadings to make it parallel to the BGD scale. Our 10-item truncated scale
produced an alpha reliability of .80 (Table 2). All items are scored on a 5-point
“agreement/disagreement” scale.
2.2.2 Current affairs and religion
In addition to the single demographic question asking political orientation, three
scales are used as measures of political, religious and social attitudes:
Authoritarianism (SL-A; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, and Heled, 2010) consists of
18 items that represent three different facets; this is the “short form” of the 30-item
measure. As presented, items 1–6 represent Authoritarian Submission; 7–12 represent
Conventionalism; 13–18 represent Authoritarian Aggression.
Egalitarianism (SL-EG; Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Feldman, 1988) consists
of a combination of eight items from two similar scales. Five of these items were used
in a Minnesota Twin Registry survey from 2008. The additional three items were
included to augment coverage of “equality of opportunity” rather than “equality of
outcome,” which the 2008 measure has been criticized for lacking.
Religiousness consists of nine items drawn from assessments used for the Min-
nesota Center for Twin and Family Research. The items are straightforward ques-
tions that ask about the frequency and importance of a variety of behaviors related
to observance of religious holidays, reading religious texts, and salience of religious
activity in family and everyday life.
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2.2.3 Genetics literacy and lay estimates of genetic influence on traits
Genetics literacy was assessed from a total of 10 items, eight selected from the Pub-
lic Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics (PUGGS; Carver
et al., 2017) questionnaire and two items used to assess public knowledge on genetics
and genetic testing (Haga et al., 2013). The full-scale PUGGS questionnaire was con-
structed to assess the knowledge of college students about genetics and genomics, and
consists of 45 items developed and reviewed by international experts from genetics,
education, and other fields.
Lay estimates of genetic influence on traits (LEGIT) were assessed from an adap-
tation of a section of the PUGGS questionnaire called the “table of traits”. We chose
to revise the original PUGGS section in order to give more balanced coverage of
physical, medical, and behavioral traits, as well as to limit the surveyed traits to
those with some significant coverage in the behavior genetic literature. Our revised
survey section is presented as a table of 21 human traits, including representatives of
normal and abnormal physical traits and normal and abnormal psychological traits,
with the following instructions:
. . . People vary in traits (physical features, behaviors, diseases and dis-
orders) such as those shown in the table below. Both genetic factors and
environmental factors contribute to differences among people. Environ-
mental factors can for example include culture, upbringing, eating habits
and exposure to pollution. For each of the characteristics below, indicate
to what extent you think genetic and environmental factors contribute to
differences among people.
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The original PUGGS table included 17 items plus one example item (eye color);
we dropped four of the original items (interest in fashion, addiction to gambling,
asthma, and religious beliefs) and added seven new items (obesity, personality, blood
pressure, athleticism, heart disease, musical talent, and sexual orientation). The
wording of two PUGGS items was changed (“intelligence in adults” became “intelli-
gence”, and “severe depression” became “depression”, in the current survey), and the
remaining 12 were kept as-is (eye color, blood group, color blindness, height, bipo-
lar disorder, schizophrenia, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), breast
cancer, diabetes, alcoholism, violent behavior, and political beliefs) for a total of 21
items. Responses are keyed on a 1 to 5 scale (Only environmental factors = 1, Mainly
environmental factors = 2, Genetic and environmental factors contribute roughly the
same = 3, Mainly genetic factors = 4, Only genetic factors = 5).
2.3 Analysis
All statistical analyses were conducted in SPSS and R. Reported subscale measures
are all mean values of scores unless otherwise indicated. Due to the large number of
variables and generally small effect sizes, significance is established at p < .01 unless
otherwise indicated.
In evaluating LEGIT responses for explanatory clustering, varimax-rotated prin-
cipal component analysis was used to highlight any possible similarities among re-
sponses on 21 traits. This use of principal components analysis is analogous to its use
in population genetics to cluster individuals into populations (Patterson, Price, &
Reich, 2006). Some prefer to use factor analysis for this purpose of clustering items,
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but the choice between principal components and factor analysis is unlikely to alter
substantive conclusions about the data (Velicer & Jackson, 1990).
3 Results
3.1 Lay estimates of genetic influence on traits form distinct
clusters
Lay estimates of genetic influence on traits (LEGIT) were similar across both samples
(Table 3). A Chi-square test of independence was performed across the two samples
for each trait to assess any significant differences in the frequency distribution of
responses. Response frequencies for each trait were non-significantly different between
the two samples.
Participants in both samples rated differences in height, eye color, blood group,
and colorblindness as the traits most strongly influenced by genetic factors, with
means falling above 4.0 and the highest for eye color (combined sample M = 4.65,
SD = 0.71). Political beliefs were estimated to have the smallest genetic contribution
in both samples, and was the only surveyed trait whose mean fell below 2.0 (combined
sample M = 1.70, SD = 0.86). Sexual orientation and political beliefs had the largest
spread in both samples, with standard deviations approaching or exceeding 1.0.
Due to the similarity of means and variance across both samples, the combined
sample (N = 1041) was used for evaluating LEGIT intercorrelation. Responses across
traits were moderately intercorrelated, and exploratory principal components anal-
ysis (PCA) was used to evaluate whether the data suggest the existence of distinct
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clusters of traits, where members of the same cluster tend to be rated similarly. A
heat-map correlation matrix of each trait included in the LEGIT items is shown in
Figure 1.
A scree plot suggests that the first four components of the PCA are most likely
to have meaningful explanatory power for variance in LEGIT scores. Together, these
four account for 48% of the variability in responses, with each accounting for a similar
proportion (11–14%). The decision to limit this analysis to the first four components
was based on joint evaluation of eigenvalue size, parallel analysis, optimal coordi-
nates, and visual inspection (see Supplementary Figure 1 for scree plot and addi-
tional justification for this decision), as well as the readily interpretable composition
of these first four components once orthogonally rotated to bring their differences
into focus. (Although rotation of the axes means that the resulting components are
technically no longer the principal components maximizing the variance of subject
scores, varimax does facilitate the identification of trait clusters. For simplicity, we
will continue to use the terminology of “principal component scores” and the like.)
Varimax rotation produced four intuitively-related groups of traits. Height, eye color,
blood group and colorblindness clustered together into a group conceptually united
as physical traits of the human body. Intelligence, personality, musical talent, violent
behavior, and athleticism clustered together into a psychological attribute group. Di-
abetes, alcoholism, obesity, blood pressure, and heart disease formed its own distinct
cluster that we labeled as lifestyle attributes. Bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, de-
pression and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) formed a clear group
of psychiatric traits, to which sexual orientation clustered unequivocally (Table 4).
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Two traits did not cluster interpretably into one of these four groups. Breast
cancer does not have a single predominate association with one component (loading
on psychiatric trait component: 0.32; loading on lifestyle trait component: 0.35).
LEGIT scores for political beliefs are negatively associated with the physical traits
component (–0.58), and is the only surveyed trait with a predominately negative
association. Regression scores for these four components were estimated and assigned
to each participant for use as predictor variables. Political beliefs and breast cancer
were omitted from this estimation due to the lack of objective interpretability of
their associations. Removing these two traits from the PCA changed each trait’s
association with the four components very little, and boosted total explained variance
from 48% to 51% (see Supplementary Table 1 for revised rotated component matrix
with political beliefs and breast cancer removed).
3.2 Lay estimates of genetic influence and social attitudes
weakly predict beliefs about agency
Beliefs about free will and determinism were moderately interrelated. Participants
surveyed on the free will and determinism scales (Sample 1, N = 301) generally
had higher mean scores on the two measures of free will than on any of the mea-
sures of determinism or essentialism, indicating greater tendency to endorse items
that reflected the belief in agency and efficacy (Table 5). The two free will scales
(FWI: FW, FAD+: FW) were significantly correlated, and all subscale measures
of determinism were generally all positively related to one another and negatively
related to measures of free will. Largest correlations among determinism scales were
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observed between BGD (genetic determinism) and FAD+: biological determinism,
between BGD and FAD+: scientific determinism, and FAD+: fatalistic determinism
and FWI: determinism. All significant associations between measures of free will and
determinism were negative and weak.
Free will and determinism scales related modestly but significantly to distinct
clusters of lay estimates of genetic influence on trait (LEGIT) scores (Table 6).
Both free will scales (FAD+ and FWI) were positively associated with high LEGIT
scores exclusively on the physical trait factor, and both primary determinism scales
were negatively related to this factor. The psychological trait factor was positively
and significantly associated with the determinism subscales of the FAD+ and the
FWI and with the BGD, but not with either measure of free will. All significant
relationships with trait clusters were weak to moderate, the strongest being the BGD
with the psychological trait factor. Both psychiatric and lifestyle LEGIT factors did
not relate significantly to any subscale measures of free will or determinism.
Social attitudes were surveyed in the domains of political orientation, authori-
tarianism, egalitarianism, and religiosity. Political orientation was assessed on a 1–5
scale in a single item across both samples (N = 1041). Overall, participants were more
likely to identify as liberal than conservative (M = 3.34, SD = 1.14). Scores on au-
thoritarianism and egalitarianism correlated with one another at r = −.64 (p < .01),
with political orientation (authoritarianism r = −.65 [more conservative], egalitari-
anism r = .64 [more liberal], both p < .01), and with religiousness (authoritarianism
r = .51, egalitarianism r = −.21, both p < .01).
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Table 7 provides an overview of the association of each measure of social attitude
with measures of free will, determinism, and the four LEGIT factors. Significant rela-
tionships are all generally small. Though modest, the association between measures of
free will and both religiousness and authoritarianism is consistent and positive, with
higher authoritarianism scores and higher religiousness scores predicting stronger be-
liefs in free will. Belief in genetic and social determinism (BGD and BSD) correlated
with authoritarianism in opposite directions, with higher authoritarianism predicting
higher BGD scores. The relationships of political ideology and egalitarianism with
measures of free will and determinism were generally weaker than the comparable
correlations for authoritarianism (Table 7).
Factor scores for both the psychiatric and psychological trait clusters correlated
moderately with political ideology, with liberals more likely to endorse high genetic
contributions to psychiatric traits and conservatives more likely to endorse the same
for psychological traits. Religiousness had a unique negative association with the
psychiatric factor. Though modest in size, the pattern that emerges is consistent:
Conservative and authoritarian (and to a lesser extent religious) attitudes tend to
be more strongly associated with stronger beliefs in free will, higher estimates of the
genetic influence on psychological traits, and lower estimates of the genetic influence
on psychiatric traits. Liberal and egalitarian attitudes are typically associated with
the opposite. Supplementary Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the com-
parably strong political influence on the psychiatric and psychological clusters by
comparing standardized factor scores.
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Political orientation was also found to have a unique influence on one LEGIT
trait in particular: sexual orientation, with liberals estimating significantly greater
genetic influence. The relationships between each trait and political orientation, au-
thoritarianism, and egalitarianism are explored further in the supplementary material
(Supplementary Table 2), as well as in an independent-samples t-test between all con-
servatives and liberals (Supplementary Table 3). This latter comparison produced the
largest significant difference in mean estimates of sexual orientation (t[772] = −8.57)
of all surveyed traits, supporting the finding that conservative and liberal estimates
of the genetic influence on this trait are greatly divergent.
Though the varied and sometimes nonintuitive relationships among these com-
plex constructs may appear to further complicate the question of free will and de-
terminism, certain patterns do emerge when multiple regression is employed. With
predictors including all demographics, scores of authoritarianism, egalitarianism, reli-
giosity, and scores on the four trait factor groups, free will (both scales) is significantly
(p < .01) predicted only by years of education (β = –0.23), authoritarianism (β =
0.55), and the physical LEGIT component (β = 0.51), with an overall (adjusted)
model fit of R2 = .23. For deterministic beliefs (both main scales), the strongest
significant predictors were the physical trait component (β = –0.35) and the psycho-
logical trait component (β = 0.26), with weaker influences of age (β = –0.24) and
the lifestyle trait component (β = 0.19), and with an overall (adjusted) model fit of
R2 = .18. Religiosity and egalitarianism were nonsignificant for both outcomes, as
was the psychiatric trait component and all other demographics listed in Table 1.
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3.3 How accurate are lay estimates of genetic influence on
traits?
The field of behavior genetics has generated empirical heritability estimates for most
of the traits surveyed, enabling a novel exploration of accuracy in lay estimates of ge-
netic influence on these traits. This allows us to investigate two important questions.
First, what is the correspondence between lay estimates and published heritability
estimates for these traits, most of which have been studied directly in large twin
samples and meta-analyses? Second, what variables are significantly associated with
individual differences in accuracy of these assessments?
In Table 8, the mean estimate of genetic influence for each trait in the combined
sample (N = 1041) is displayed alongside the estimate of heritability for the compara-
ble trait in published behavior genetics literature. LEGIT scores for each participant
on each surveyed trait were transformed to the same scale as the published estimates,
where 0 for heritability variance is equivalent to “only environmental factors” (a 1 on
the survey) and 1 is equivalent to “only genetic factors” (a 5 on the survey). “Genetic
and environmental factors contribute roughly equally” (a 3 on the survey) is taken
to be a functional equivalent to stating that 50% of the variance in a trait is due to
genetic factors, and this is converted to an estimate of .50 on a “heritability” scale.
Most published estimates are taken from the 2015 meta-analysis by Polderman et.
al, which documents the results of fifty years of twin studies on over 17,000 separate
traits (Polderman et al., 2015). The name of the comparable trait used in the pub-
lished literature is displayed alongside the name used in the LEGIT table of traits
from the current study. In several cases including political beliefs, violent behavior
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and obesity, the meta-analytic heritability estimate represents a broader category
of related traits for which a heritability estimate was provided in the meta-analysis.
This estimate is considered superior to individual estimates for a specific trait, which
might suffer from smaller independent samples. For example, since few twin studies
on political orientation have been conducted, the category was chosen that included
this trait in the meta-analysis (“societal attitudes”). A broad category also allows
for a looser interpretation of the definition of the trait by lay people. Since many
people may not have a sense of the psychometric definition of intelligence, for ex-
ample, the category “higher-level cognitive functions” may align more closely with
a lay understanding. One trait did not have a recent heritability estimate available
(colorblindness) and was omitted from accuracy analyses.
The correlation between lay estimates and published estimates is .771 (Figure 2),
making it among the largest of all associations found in the dataset. Lay estimates
of some traits aligned much more closely with published estimates than others. Al-
though lay estimates of genetic influence on physical traits (eye color, height, and
blood group) tended to be highly accurate, estimates of behavioral traits (includ-
ing musical talent, alcoholism and personality) also were among those most closely
aligned with their published counterparts. Sexual orientation represents the largest
discrepancy between lay and published estimates, with most participants overesti-
mating the genetic contribution with respect to the published literature. Removing
this trait from the correlation boosts it to .84. Other notable discrepancies include
1Since the samples for generating published estimates and lay estimates are not comparable,
this is considered an ecological correlation. A p-value for this correlation would not necessarily be
meaningful or interpretable and therefore has not been included.
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breast cancer, which was generally overestimated, and obesity, which was underesti-
mated.
3.4 Why are some people more accurate than others?
Individual differences in accuracy were readily apparent. Once converted to the 0–1
“heritability” metric, lay estimates of genetic influence can be used as an individual-
level measure of accuracy by subtracting each participant’s score on each trait from
that trait’s published estimate. The absolute value of this difference score therefore
can be used to represent the distance of each participant’s estimate from the empirical
estimate. Averaging this distance across all 20 traits (omitting colorblindness) can
then function as a single variable to roughly capture the accuracy of each participant’s
view of the genetic influence on human traits across the surveyed domains. The
mean, standard deviation and range of difference in accuracy for each trait is shown
in Table 9, and the mean absolute difference score of all surveyed traits together is
.18 (SD = .05). (For a full comparison of difference scores with their directionality
preserved, thus indicating over- and underestimation of each trait’s genetic influence,
see Supplementary Figure 1).
These mean indices of accuracy across participants have significant associations
with several measured variables. While accuracy index does not correlate significantly
with any FAD+ or FWI subscale of free will (FWI: p = .71; FAD+: p = .77)
or determinism (FWI: p = .54; FAD+: p = .98) it does correlate modestly with
both essentialism scales: genetic (BGD) and social (BSD) determinism at r = −.12
(p = .03) and r = −.13 (p = .02), respectively, indicating that stronger genetic and
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social deterministic beliefs are associated with less distance from the mean empirical
heritability for these traits. Table 9 shows the association of BGD and BSD with each
accuracy index score across traits as well as with the overall mean accuracy score.
While the significant association of mean accuracy with BSD is due to an overall
pattern of weakly negative correlations, the association with BGD is due to fewer
stronger ones, especially for obesity (r = −.19), intelligence (r = −.17), personality
(r = −.21) and violent behavior (r = −.28), all p < .01 (Table 9). In a regression
model predicting overall accuracy, BGD and BSD together explain only 3% of the
variance (p = .01).
Though overall mean accuracy scores do not correlate significantly with political
orientation (p = .19), accuracy scores on four individual traits do. Schizophrenia
(r = −.10, p < .01), diabetes (r = −.08, p < .01), and alcoholism (r = .10, p < .01)
all have weak negative associations with political orientation, meaning that conser-
vatives tend to be slightly more inaccurate than liberals on these particular traits.
Accuracy on one trait, sexual orientation, is negatively associated with a more lib-
eral orientation, and this association is considerably larger at r = .22 (p < .01).
The size of this accuracy difference is large enough to change the overall correlation
between published and lay estimates of genetic influence from r = .77 in the full
sample to r = .81 for all conservatives and r = .73 for all liberals, meaning that the
lay estimates of conservatives align more closely with published estimates than those
of liberals when sexual orientation is included in the table of traits (Supplementary
Figure 2). The difference in accuracy scores between “very liberal” and “very conser-
vative” individuals, as well as how those of moderates compare, can be seen for every
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trait in a series of bar graphs comprising Supplementary Figure 3. For sexual orien-
tation, all political groups overestimated the known proportion of genetic influence
on sexual orientation, though “very liberal” individuals did so the most and “very
conservative” individuals the least. For further exploration of the influence of polit-
ical ideology on both accuracy and magnitude of LEGIT scores, see Supplementary
Figure 4 and Supplementary Figure 5.
In addition to scores on the BGD and BSD scales of belief in determinism, several
surveyed demographic variables significantly predict higher accuracy in overall esti-
mates of genetic influence. These include genetic literacy scores (r = −.17, p < .01),
years of education (r = −.12, p < .01), number of children (r = −.13, p < .01)
and age (r = −.11, p < .01). The negative direction of these correlations indicates
that higher values on all four of these qualities predict greater accuracy in estimates
(less distance from published estimate). Gender is also associated with accuracy:
women are significantly more accurate in their predictions of genetic influence on
traits than are men, with a mean distance from the published estimates of 0.17 for
women (SD = 0.05) and 0.19 (SD = 0.05) for men (t[1036] = −4.8, p < .01)).
While this mean difference is small, women are more accurate on 17 out of the 20
traits, significantly (p < .01) for five traits and marginally for another five (p < .05).
Men are not significantly or marginally more accurate on any surveyed traits. The
largest significant (p < .01) differences in accuracy between men and women are for
diabetes2 (t = −3.4), obesity2 (t = −4.6), athleticism (t = −4.5), ADHD (t = −2.6),
and musical talent (t = −3.5). A multiple regression model that includes age, gender,
2T-statistic and p-value presented have been corrected for inequality of variance.
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education and number of children as predictors helps clarify which of these remain
meaningful when controlling for others. (Genetic literacy scores were not included
because they were not assessed in the second sample.) This model renders the effect
of age nonsignificant (p = .17), but retains marginal to significant effects of years of
education (p = .04), number of children (p = .02), and especially gender (p < .01).
Gender, education and number of children jointly explain 5% of the variance in accu-
racy (p < .01). Do mothers of multiple children have the greatest accuracy overall?
A two-way factorial ANOVA is conducted to compare the main effects of gender
and number of children (none, one, and two or more) on mean LEGIT accuracy,
and any possible interaction. These result supports a significant effect on accuracy
of gender, favoring women (F [1, 732] = 9.56, p < .01), a marginal effect of number
children (F [2, 732] = 4.18, p = .02), and no evidence for an interaction between them
(p = .47) (Figure 1). Together, the results of multiple regression and ANOVA across
categories support the finding that educated mothers of multiple children are signif-
icantly more accurate than others in predicting the genetic influence on a number of
human traits.
4 Discussion
The aim of the present study was to add a novel assessment of beliefs about trait
heritability to the ongoing debate about free will and determinism from a uniquely
behavioral genetic perspective. In doing so, we have collated a corpus of beliefs and
assumptions of individual Americans about genetic and environmental contributions
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to a variety of human traits, and have discovered that beliefs about genetic influence
on these traits tend to cluster into four factors comprising physical, psychological,
psychiatric, and lifestyle-oriented traits. That these categories are significantly as-
sociated with measures of free will and determinism, as well as with outcomes such
as political ideology, is informative as to how the general public forms opinions
about empirically established genetic relationships. While this correlational study
does not engender causal inference, our findings are consistent with a complex and
multifaceted origin and development of these beliefs. This provides a strong foun-
dation for further probing these questions in a forthcoming study, using a sample
of adopted siblings and their parents, with the ultimate goal of understanding the
roles of parental influence, home environment, and genetic makeup in the formation
and development of beliefs about free will and the genetic and environmental contri-
butions to human behavior. This novel, genetically-sensitive angle will represent the
first empirical investigation into the heritability of beliefs about heritability.
The current investigation found that multiple surveyed measures of free will and
determinism are significantly related to the magnitude of scores comprising the phys-
ical trait factor of lay estimates of genetic influence. Both free will subscales (FAD+
and FWI) correlated positively with physical trait factor scores (r = .32 and r = .25,
respectively; both p < .01), while the determinism subscales tended to correlate in
the negative direction with roughly equal magnitude (Table 6). The only other sig-
nificant association between the FAD+ and FWI scales with the trait factors is that
of the determinism subscales (FAD+: SD, FWI: DET) with the psychological trait
factor, at r = .22 and r = .17, respectively (p < .01). The key pattern to emerge is
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that belief in the existence of free will is related significantly to beliefs about high
genetic contributions to purely physical traits, such as eye color and height, rela-
tive to other categories of traits, but belief in a deterministic universe is associated
with stronger beliefs about the genetic contribution to psychological traits, such as
intelligence and personality. A significant correlation between the FAD+ determin-
ism scale and beliefs about the heritability of behavior might be expected given that
some of the FAD+ items reflect belief in the biological determinism of behavior (e.g.,
“Parents’ character will determine the character of their children”). The FWI deter-
minism scale, however, deals only with a philosophical conception of determinism
(e.g., “Given the way things were at the Big Bang, there is only one way for every-
thing to happen in the universe after that”). It seems that individuals who endorse
the existence of a deterministic universe have a tendency to view genetic contribu-
tions to psychological traits as a way to account for behavior consistent with this
worldview, although admittedly the correlations here are modest in magnitude.
The weak negative correlations between endorsement of free will and endorsement
of determinism, pairs of all scales in the range of r = −.14 to –.18, offer support for
the conclusion (Chan et al., 2016) that there is little empirical basis for the existence
of a “compatibilist” or “incompatibilist” orientation of individuals towards questions
of free will. J. Keller’s genetic and social determinism scales are particularly inter-
esting, especially in their singular relation to the accuracy of genetic influence on
traits among the measures of agency. It is unsurprising that the Belief in Genetic
Determinism scale (BGD) is a strong predictor of high ratings of the genetic contri-
bution to psychological traits (r = .54, p < .01), largely because many of the items
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in the scale are directly assessing attitudes about the heritability of psychological
traits; e.g., “Intelligence is a trait that is strongly determined by genetic predis-
positions” and “Many talents that individuals possess can be attributed to genetic
causes” (Keller, 2005). It is more surprising that the BGD is one of the only free
will/determinism-related measures that predicts accuracy as well (the other being
BSD), with marginal mean associations with accuracy and the strongest individual
predictions on accuracy for violent behavior, personality, obesity and intelligence
(Table 9). Our data suggest that individuals who score low on the BGD scale, rather
than holding a more enlightened view about the role of genetics in behavior, tend to
discount or be unaware of empirical evidence on the heritability of behavioral traits.
While Keller characterizes high scores on genetic determinism as being associated
with “prejudice and in-group bias”, it is worth noting that no measure of free will
or determinism predicted accuracy as well as the BGD, which was only weakly as-
sociated (positively) with authoritarianism and (negatively) with egalitarianism in
our sample. More generally, belief in the existence of free will and an endorsement of
higher or lower genetic or environmental contributions to particular traits in differ-
ent categories show no consistent relationship (and often none at all). Therefore, no
necessary connection appears to obtain between these factors in the minds of our par-
ticipants, which lends further support to the conclusion that the distinction between
compatibilism and incompatibilism does not capture actual patterns of variation in
doxastic commitment in the broader population.
The association of political ideology with the magnitude of heritability estimates
is also deserving of attention. That political ideology is associated with beliefs about
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and trust in scientific topics has been documented for climate change (McCright &
Dunlap, 2011), evolution (Nadelson & Hardy, 2015), and vaccinations, nuclear power,
and genetically modified organisms (Hamilton, 2015). While the present study is
likely the first to document the relationship between political orientation and opin-
ions on the heritability of specific human traits, many of the significant outcomes
seem to be in line with the results of related research. Conservatives are significantly
more likely to believe that correlates of success and achievement, like intelligence
and musical ability, have a greater genetic component, while liberals are more likely
to think the same for traits that have been historically stigmatized, like psychiatric
disorders and sexual orientation. Similar findings were documented by Suhay and
Jayaratne, who suggested that these differences in attribution may result from the
tendency of political ideologues to “endorse genetic explanations where their policy
positions are bolstered by ‘naturalizing’ human differences” (Suhay & Jayaratne,
2013). The current study replicates their finding that conservatives tend to endorse
genetic explanations as causes of socioeconomic differences (intelligence, violent be-
havior, etc.) and liberals tend to endorse the same for sexual orientation. These pat-
terns are consistent with research suggesting that moral judgments are a hallmark
of the political split in the United States, which characterizes liberals, for example,
as more inclined to endorse moral foundations built around care and compassion
(Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, and Peterson, 2010). This
tendency may in part explain why left-leaning participants are more likely to endorse
a genetic explanation for psychiatric disorders, which may inspire compassion and
an understanding of immutability.
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Despite these ideological differences in intuitions of genetic influence, there is no
association between overall mean accuracy (distance from published estimates) and
political ideology, as the collection of biases that forms at each end of the political
spectrum seems to balance out on the whole. Conservatives, moderates and liberals
together produce a correlation between intuited and published heritability estimates
that is among the strongest of any relationship found in the dataset (r = .77),
indicating that even in the absence of genetic knowledge, and even if social attitudes
bias individual assumptions, people’s observations and intuitions about the genetic
contributions to human traits are relatively informed. This finding dovetails with
work led by Celeste Condit indicating that laypeople’s ideas about heritability and
genetic determinism are more nuanced than often assumed by scientists (Condit et
al., 2006; Condit, 2011).
This study is not without its limitations. Most of the reported significant corre-
lations among measures of agency, social attitudes, and demographic variables are
in the small to moderate range, and the large number of analyses almost certainly
guarantees that some of these will prove to be spurious if replications are attempted.
The non-representative nature of the Mechanical Turk sample likely limits the ap-
plicability of some of these modest correlations, particularly given that the sample
is non-representative on some of the variables associated with outcomes (both sam-
ples are significantly more educated, more liberal, and less religious than the general
population). Though the overall relationship of published estimates of heritability
and lay estimates of genetic influence is robust, many of these published estimates
will likely change as more traits become studied in larger samples, particularly for
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those whose estimates are taken from single studies rather than meta-analyses (e.g.,
sexual orientation). Individual estimates of “accuracy” are further tenuous predictors
because the nature of difference scores tends to inflate noise, and these are no excep-
tion. Among the few significant predictors of accuracy that were pinned down, none
of these together account for more than a total of 5% of the variance in accuracy.
Nevertheless, it is perhaps remarkable that accuracy was significantly predictable
at all. That motherhood and education are the strongest demographic predictors
of accuracy in estimates of genetic influence is consistent with the interpretation
that people may develop their attitudes about nature and nurture with input from
everyday observations and experience, rather than primarily from biases about social
and political issues. This is also consistent with an interpretation of the finding
of Crosswaite and Asbury (Crosswaite and Asbury, 2019) that teachers of older
children are more accurate in their beliefs about the genetics of educationally relevant
behaviors: Belief in the malleability of younger children is common, but as they age
this belief may be partially dispelled as the canalization of personality becomes more
evident. Mothers may similarly develop more accurate perceptions as their children’s
personalities emerge. While it is always possible that women with more accurate
intuitions about the bases for individual differences are more likely to want children,
parents, after all, have the ability to observe firsthand the results of an empirical
experiment on the heritability of human traits in their own home. They can see that
their children resemble them along multiple dimensions; furthermore, a parent of
multiple children is able to see how the shared environment does not necessarily make
them alike. Mothers may be uniquely observant of their children’s abilities, needs and
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attributes. Although it is clear that social and political biases are associated with the
magnitude of these estimates, the best predictors of accuracy in the current sample
are education and the experience of parenthood—an encouraging prospect for the
public understanding of findings from behavior genetics.
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7.1 Table 1
Table 1: Percentages for both samples on a selection of demographic variables
Sample 1 (N = 301) Sample 2 (N = 740)
Age range (%)
18 to 25 10.6 9.2
25 to 34 50.8 46.2
35 to 44 25.2 25.1
45 to 54 8.3 10.8
55 to 64 3.3 5.9
65+ 1.7 2.7
Gender (%)
Female 42.9 48.2
Male 56.8 51.5
Other 0.3 0.3
Marital status (%)
Married 37.2 41.2
Separated 1.7 0.9
Never married 54.8 49.7
Divorced 6.0 7.2
Widowed 0.3 0.9
Have children (%)a
Yes 35.5 44.3
No 64.5 55.7
Number of children (%)
None 55.7
1 15.0
2+ 29.3
Highest educational degree (%)
Never completed high school 0.7 0.3
High school/GED 26.2 24.5
Vocational/technical 4.7 7.7
Community college/associate 15.6 16.6
Four-year college/university 47.5 42.3
Masters 3.7 6.4
Doctoral 1.7 2.3
a Indicates marginally significant (.01 < p < .05) result of Chi-square test
of independence on response frequencies for each item across Sample 1 and
Sample 2. No demographic criterion differed significantly across samples
below the p < .01 level.
Note: Number of children and religious affiliation were not assessed for
sample 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 1 (continued): Percentages for both samples on a selection of demographic variables
Sample 1 (N = 301) Sample 2 (N = 740)
Working (%)
Yes 86.4 85.1
No 13.6 14.9
Approx. hours/week worked (%)
0 to 5 hours 13.6 14.6
6 to 10 hours 0.66 1.1
11 to 15 hours 0.66 1.6
16 to 20 hours 2.3 2.3
21 to 25 hours 2.9 4.1
26 to 30 hours 6.0 4.3
31 to 35 hours 3.7 8.1
36 to 40 hours 43.5 41.2
41 to 45 hours 16.6 15.0
More than 45 hours 10.0 7.7
Religious affiliation (%)
Protestant 20.6
Catholic 14.3
Other Christian 9.6
Jewish 0.66
Muslim 0
Other affiliation 4.3
No affiliation 50.5
Political orientation (%)
Very conservative 4.7 6.6
Conservative 18.9 19.2
Moderate 24.9 25.9
Liberal 34.6 31.9
Very liberal 16.9 16.4
Note: Number of children and religious affiliation were not assessed for
sample 1 and 2, respectively.
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7.2 Table 2
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and alpha reliabilities for each scale and subscale used for measuring
attitudes on the causes of human behavior
Number Alpha Alpha
of items M SD (published) (sample)
Free Will and Determinism Scale-Plus (FAD+)
Free will (FAD-FW) 7 3.78 0.72 .70 .83
Scientific determinism (FAD-SD) 19 2.83 0.60 .69 .88
General (SD-GEN)a 5 2.85 0.79 NA .78
Environmental (SD-ENV)a 5 3.00 0.71 NA .74
Biological (SD-BIO)a 5 2.67 0.80 NA .79
Fatalistic determinism (FAD-FD) 5 2.48 0.73 .82 .85
Unpredictability (FAD-UNP) 8 3.38 0.64 .72 .73
Free Will Inventory (FWI)
Free will (FWI-FW) 5 3.72 0.84 .80 .87
Determinism (FWI-DET) 5 2.41 0.83 .77 .82
Belief in Genetic Determinism Scale (BGD)b 10 3.05 0.69 .84 .85
Belief in Social Determinism Scale (BSD)b 10 3.56 0.54 .85 .80
Authoritarianismb 18 2.52 0.88 .82 .95
Egalitarianisma,b 8 3.83 1.01 .81 .95
Religiousness 9 1.95 0.93 NA .94
Genetics literacya,b 10 1.78 0.35 .69 .72
Lay Estimate of Genetic Influence
on Traits (LEGIT)a 21 3.29 0.34 .67 .78
Note: Alpha reliability in each published scale is compared to that of Sample
1 (N = 301) where available, with the exception of LEGIT, which is measured
across both samples (N = 1041).
a Denotes scales adapted but changed significantly from source. The NAs
for “published alpha” for each FAD-SD subscale represents their first use as
pilot items in the current study. Published alpha values for genetic literacy
and the LEGIT items are based on their PUGGS source items (see text for
references).
b Published alphas are for longer scales (see text for explanation).
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7.3 Table 3
Table 3: Mean and standard deviation for the lay estimate of genetic influence on 21 human traits
Sample 1 Sample 2 Combined
(N = 301) (N = 740) (N = 1041)
Trait M SD M SD M SD
Eye color 4.67 0.71 4.64 0.7 4.65 0.71
Blood group (ABO) 4.61 0.79 4.64 0.73 4.63 0.75
Color blindness 4.51 0.81 4.41 0.82 4.44 0.82
Height 4.15 0.74 4.17 0.73 4.16 0.73
Bipolar disorder 3.64 0.86 3.57 0.84 3.59 0.85
Schizophrenia 3.61 0.88 3.55 0.85 3.57 0.86
Attention deficit/hyperactivity 3.54 0.91 3.45 0.92 3.48 0.92
disorder (ADHD)
Sexual orientation 3.35 1.16 3.41 1.2 3.39 1.19
Intelligence 3.37 0.86 3.32 0.82 3.34 0.83
Breast cancer 3.38 0.7 3.27 0.75 3.31 0.74
Athleticism 3.19 0.86 3.2 0.87 3.2 0.87
Heart diseasea 3.12 0.75 3.16 0.73 3.15 0.74
Blood pressure 3.04 0.78 3.02 0.71 3.03 0.73
Diabetesa 2.92 0.7 3.02 0.77 2.99 0.75
Depression 2.9 0.82 2.96 0.77 2.94 0.78
Musical talent 2.84 0.93 2.93 1.03 2.91 1.00
Personality 2.66 0.78 2.77 0.76 2.74 0.76
Alcoholism 2.72 0.81 2.71 0.84 2.71 0.83
Obesity 2.65 0.78 2.68 0.77 2.67 0.77
Violent behavior 2.47 0.75 2.52 0.74 2.51 0.74
Political beliefs 1.67 0.89 1.72 0.85 1.7 0.86
Note: The contribution of genetic and environmental factors to each trait was
rated on a 1 (only environmental) to 5 (only genetic) scale. Higher scores
indicate greater judgment of genetic contributions to variation in the trait
relative to environmental contributions.
a Indicates marginally significant (.01 < p < .05) result of Chi-square test
of independence on response frequencies for each item across Sample 1 and
Sample 2. In cases where bins contained very few participant responses (e.g.,
“1” for “height”), the Chi-square test was repeated without inclusion of the
small bin(s) and the smallest p-value is reported if significant. No trait item
differed significantly across samples below the p < .01 level.
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7.4 Table 4
Table 4: Varimax-rotated component matrix showing each of the 21 traits’ association with four
extracted components
Component
Trait 1 2 3 4
Eye color 0.80 0.11 0.01 –0.03
Blood group (ABO) 0.77 0.14 0.03 –0.04
Color blindness 0.66 0.26 0.06 0.01
Height 0.64 0.02 0.02 0.17
Bipolar disorder 0.13 0.75 0.01 0.09
Schizophrenia 0.18 0.78 0.03 0.06
Attention deficit/hyperactivity 0.21 0.61 0.06 0.21
disorder (ADHD)
Sexual orientation 0.07 0.52 0.17 –0.09
Intelligence 0.11 0.09 0.71 0.01
Breast cancera 0.19 0.32 –0.10 0.35
Athleticism 0.21 0.02 0.63 0.03
Heart disease 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.68
Blood pressure 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.71
Diabetes –0.02 0.10 –0.02 0.69
Depression –0.12 0.55 0.19 0.25
Musical talent –0.05 0.12 0.72 0.07
Personality –0.17 0.04 0.62 0.12
Alcoholism –0.24 0.29 0.23 0.42
Obesity –0.25 0.10 0.14 0.61
Violent behavior –0.32 0.21 0.54 0.20
Political beliefsa –0.58 –0.06 0.37 0.20
Total % variance explained 12% 14% 11% 11%
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method:
Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Bolded values indicate predominant loading for each trait.
a Political beliefs and breast cancer did not have an interpretable predominant
loading.
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7.6 Table 6
Table 6: Correlations and p-values of select measures of free will and determinism with the four
components of genetic influence estimates
Free Will Determinism
FAD+ FWI FAD+ (SD) FWI BGD BSD
r p r p r p r p r p r p
Physical trait 0.32 < .01 0.25 < .01 –.22 < .01 –.32 < .01 –.16 0.01 0.21 < .01
factor
Psychiatric trait –.03 0.56 0 0.97 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.86 0.15 0.01 –.04 0.45
factor
Lifestyle trait 0.12 0.04 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.56
factor
Psychological trait –.11 0.06 –.10 0.07 0.22 < .01 0.17 < .01 0.54 < .01 –.03 0.61
factor
Note: Positive correlations indicate that higher scores on free will/determinism
scales are positively associated with lay estimates of genetic influence for the trait
components. Correlations are bolded at the p < .01 level.
Abbreviations: FAD+ (SD): Free will and determinism scale (scientific determin-
ism); FWI: Free will inventory; BGD: belief in genetic determinism scale; BSD:
belief in social determinism scale
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7.7 Table 7
Table 7: Correlations and p-values of political ideology, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism with
free will and determinism subscales and components of lay estimates of genetic influence on traits
Political orientation Authoritarianism Egalitarianism Religiousness
r p r p r p r p
Free will
FAD+ –.13 0.03 0.27 <.01 –.12 0.04 0.20 <.01
FWI –.04 0.49 0.18 <.01 –.05 0.4 0.17 <.01
Determinism
FAD+ (SD) 0.01 0.87 0 0.99 –.02 0.76 –.09 0.1
FWI –.10 0.07 0.20 <.01 –.06 0.28 0.03 0.61
Genetic (BGD) –.09 0.10 0.16 0.01 –.12 0.04 0.03 0.66
Social (BSD) 0.14 0.01 –.18 <.01 0.11 0.07 –.07 0.24
Physical trait factor 0.02 0.46 –.16 0.01 0.19 <.01 –.03 0.57
Psychiatric trait factor 0.22 <.01 –.17 <.01 0.11 0.05 –.21 <.01
Lifestyle trait factor 0.01 0.79 0.09 0.11 –.12 0.04 0.11 0.06
Psychological trait factor –.15 <.01 0.19 <.01 –.15 0.01 0.06 0.33
Note: Positive correlations indicate higher scores on political orientation (more lib-
eral = higher score), authoritarianism, or egalitarianism scales relating positively
to higher genetic influence estimates for the factor composites.
Abbreviations: FAD+ (SD): Free will and determinism scale (scientific determin-
ism); FWI: Free will inventory; BGD: belief in genetic determinism scale; BSD:
belief in social determinism scale
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7.8 Table 8
Table 8: Mean values for LEGIT (lay estimate of genetic influence on traits) for each of the 21 traits
surveyed in a sample of 1041 participants and their associated published heritability estimates
Name of trait Name of trait LEGIT Published
in MTurk survey in publications Study scorea mean h2
Eye color Eye color Zhu et al. (2004) 0.91 0.92
Blood group (ABO)b NA NA 0.91 1.00
Color blindnessc NA NA 0.86 NA
Height Height Polderman et al. (2015) 0.79 0.80
Bipolar disorder Bipolar affective disorder Polderman et al. (2015) 0.65 0.76
Schizophrenia Schizophrenia Polderman et al. (2015) 0.64 0.77
Attention deficit/hyperactivity Hyperkinetic disorders Polderman et al. (2015) 0.62 0.58
disorder (ADHD)
Sexual orientation Sexual orientationd L˚angstro¨m et al. (2010) 0.60 0.28
Intelligence Higher-level cognitive Polderman et al. (2015) 0.58 0.63
functions
Breast cancer Breast cancer Mucci et al. (2016) 0.58 0.31
Athleticism Athletic abilityd Vinkhuyzen et al. (2009) 0.55 0.47
Heart disease Death from coronary Zdravkovic et al. (2002) 0.54 0.48
heart diseased
Blood pressure Blood pressure functions Polderman et al. (2015) 0.51 0.47
Diabetes Type 1 diabetes, Polderman et al. (2015), 0.50 0.64
Type 2 diabetese Kan et al. (2016)
Depression Recurrent depressive Polderman et al. (2015) 0.49 0.45
disorder
Musical talent Musical abilityd Vinkhuyzen et al. (2009) 0.48 0.48
Personality Temperament and Polderman et al. (2015) 0.44 0.45
personality functions
Alcoholism Mental and behavioural Polderman et al. (2015) 0.43 0.42
disorders
Obesity Weight maintenance Polderman et al. (2015) 0.42 0.63
functions
Violent behavior Conduct disorders Polderman et al. (2015) 0.38 0.49
Political beliefs Societal attitudes Polderman et al. (2015) 0.18 0.31
Note: Meta-analyses were used when possible for the most recent and robust estimate,
with Polderman et al. (2015) providing over half of the estimates. Mean heritability for all
participants was used when possible, though same-sex heritability was used where this was
not available. Among the traits that were absent or too nonspecific from the Polderman
et al. (2015) meta-analysis, estimates of athletic ability and musical talent were taken from
the Vinkhuyzen et al. (2009) meta-analysis on the heritability of talents and abilities. Four
traits (eye color, sexual orientation, breast cancer and heart disease) were not found to be
included in any recent meta-analyses, so individual studies were selected on the basis of
recency and sample size.
a LEGIT: Lay estimates of genetic influence on traits. Scores presented have been con-
verted from 5-point Likert scale mean values (see Table 3) to 0–1 percentage scale.
b No recent large-scale twin study of blood group was found, so a value of 1.00 was assigned
on the basis that ABO blood group is known to be essentially mediated entirely by genetic
factors.
c Color blindness was left out of accuracy analyses as no recent large-scale twin study was
found to provide an accurate published estimate of heritability.
d Mean of heritability estimates for men and women.
e Only type 1 diabetes was reported in the Polderman et al. (2015) meta-analysis. Since we
cannot be sure which type of diabetes lay estimates reflect, our published estimate value
reflects this value averaged together with the estimate from a recent heritability study of
type 2 diabetes (Kan et al., 2016).
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7.9 Table 9
Table 9: Range, mean, and standard deviations for absolute difference scores on genetic influence
for each trait (N = 1041) and correlations of both essentialism scales with these difference scores
(N = 301)
Name of trait BGD BSD
Min Max M SD r r
Eye color 0.08 0.92 0.13 0.12 0.07 –.19∗∗
Blood group (ABO) 0 1 0.09 0.19 0.07 –.18∗∗
Height 0.05 0.8 0.14 0.12 –.07 –.07
Bipolar disorder 0.01 0.76 0.18 0.16 –.12∗ –.06
Schizophrenia 0.02 0.77 0.19 0.16 –.15∗ –.08
ADHD 0.08 0.58 0.19 0.13 –.08 –.02
Sexual orientation 0.03 0.72 0.37 0.22 0.1 –.03
Intelligence 0.12 0.63 0.18 0.11 –.17∗∗ –.03
Breast cancer 0.06 0.69 0.28 0.16 0.01 –.02
Athleticism 0.03 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.06 –.08
Heart disease 0.02 0.52 0.13 0.14 0.01 –.10
Blood pressure 0.03 0.53 0.13 0.13 –.09 –.06
Diabetes 0.11 0.64 0.2 0.12 0 –.06
Depression 0.05 0.55 0.15 0.13 0.04 –.06
Musical talent 0.02 0.52 0.19 0.16 –.01 0.08
Personality 0.05 0.55 0.14 0.13 –.21∗∗ –.02
Alcoholism 0.08 0.58 0.17 0.12 0.03 –.06
Obesity 0.12 0.63 0.24 0.15 –.19∗∗ –.04
Violent behavior 0.01 0.51 0.16 0.15 –.28∗∗ 0.1
Political beliefs 0.06 0.69 0.22 0.12 –.13∗ –.06
All traits 0.08 0.46 0.18 0.05 –.12∗ –.13∗
Note: A negative correlation indicates greater accuracy; i.e., less distance from
the accurate estimate.
Abbreviations: BGD: belief in genetic determinism scale; BSD: belief in social
determinism scale
∗∗ Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
∗ Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
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7.10 Supplementary Table 1
Supplementary Table 1: Varimax-rotated component matrix showing each of 19 traits’ association
with four extracted components (breast cancer and political beliefs removed)
Component
Trait 1 2 3 4
Eye color 0.81 0.12 –0.03 –0.05
Blood group (ABO) 0.78 0.15 0 –0.05
Color blindness 0.67 0.27 0.04 –0.02
Height 0.65 0.02 0.01 0.12
Bipolar disorder 0.14 0.76 0.01 0.09
Schizophrenia 0.2 0.79 0.03 0.07
Attention deficit/hyperactivity 0.21 0.62 0.05 0.18
disorder (ADHD)
Sexual orientation 0.09 0.51 0.17 –0.09
Intelligence 0.12 0.08 0.72 0.02
Athleticism 0.24 0.02 0.64 0.03
Heart disease 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.65
Blood pressure 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.70
Diabetes 0.01 0.11 –0.07 0.72
Depression –0.11 0.57 0.17 0.27
Musical talent –0.03 0.12 0.72 0.08
Personality –0.17 0.06 0.62 0.15
Alcoholism –0.21 0.29 0.22 0.46
Obesity –0.21 0.1 0.11 0.66
Violent behavior –0.32 0.21 0.54 0.22
Total % variance explained 14% 13% 12% 12%
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method:
Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Bolded values indicate predominant loading for each trait.
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7.11 Supplementary Table 2
Supplementary Table 2: Correlations and p-values of political ideology, authoritarianism, and egal-
itarianism with lay estimates of genetic influence on all 21 traits, as well as the four components of
LEGIT scores. For the 21 human traits surveyed for opinions on their relative contributions from
genes and environment, 9 of these correlated significantly (p < .01) but generally modestly with
liberalism: Schizophrenia (r = .12), bipolar disorder (r = .08), intelligence (r = −.10), personal-
ity (r = −.13), political beliefs (r = −.12), depression (r = .08), attention deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (r = .13), musical talent (r = −.14), and sexual orientation (r = .29).
Political ideology Authoritarianism Egalitarianism
r p r p r p
Height 0.01 0.86 –.02 0.75 0.07 0.23
Bipolar disorder 0.08 0.01 –.03 0.58 0.02 0.72
Eye color 0.03 0.41 –.12 0.04 0.18 0
Schizophrenia 0.12 <.01 –.03 0.65 0.02 0.72
Diabetes 0.03 0.37 0.10 0.09 –.08 0.16
Alcoholism 0.04 0.25 0 0.97 –.02 0.78
Obesity 0.03 0.35 0.11 0.06 –.19 <.01
Intelligence –.10 0 0.12 0.04 –.09 0.11
Blood group (ABO) 0.08 0.01 –.22 <.01 0.23 <.01
Personality –.13 <.01 0.22 <.01 –.16 0.01
Breast cancer 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.61 0.02 0.77
Violent behavior –.01 0.78 0.16 0.01 –.14 0.02
Blood pressure 0 0.97 0.06 0.3 –.05 0.36
Political beliefs –.12 <.01 0.14 0.01 –.22 <.01
Athleticism –.05 0.10 0.02 0.72 –.07 0.21
Depression 0.08 0.01 –.09 0.14 0.05 0.43
Color blindness 0.07 0.02 –.19 <.01 0.16 0.01
ADHD 0.13 <.01 –.17 0 0.06 0.31
Heart disease 0.04 0.19 –.02 0.75 0 0.98
Musical talent –.14 <.01 0.20 <.01 –.14 0.02
Sexual orientation 0.29 <.01 –.23 <.01 0.22 <.01
Physical trait factor 0.02 0.46 –.16 0.01 0.19 <.01
Psychiatric trait factor 0.22 <.01 –.17 <.01 0.11 0.05
Lifestyle trait factor 0.01 0.79 0.09 0.11 –.12 0.04
Psychological trait factor –.15 <.01 0.19 <.01 –.15 0.01
Note: Correlations bolded at the p < .01 level.
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7.12 Supplementary Table 3
Supplementary Table 3: Results of independent-samples t-test between conservatives (participants
selecting “very conservative” or “conservative”, N = 262) and liberals (participants selecting “lib-
eral” or “very liberal”, N = 512) on mean estimates of the genetic contributions to variation between
individuals on 21 human traits
Name Mean Std.
of trait t p difference error
Height 0.21 0.84 0.01 0.06
Bipolar disorder –2.73 0.01 –0.18 0.07
Eye color –1.26 0.21 –0.07 0.05
Schizophrenia –4.3 <.01 –0.28 0.07
Diabetes –0.62 0.54 –0.04 0.06
Alcoholism –0.65 0.52 –0.04 0.06
Obesity –0.57 0.57 –0.03 0.06
Intelligence 2.28 0.02 0.14 0.06
Blood group (ABO) –2.12 0.03 –0.12 0.05
Personality 3.58 <.01 0.21 0.06
Breast cancer –2.27 0.02 –0.13 0.06
Violent behavior 0.25 0.81 0.01 0.06
Blood pressure 0.06 0.96 0 0.06
Political beliefs 3.49 <.01 0.22 0.06
Athleticism 1.28 0.2 0.08 0.07
Depression –2.37 0.02 –0.14 0.06
Color blindness –2.22 0.03 –0.13 0.06
ADHD –4.36 <.01 –0.30 0.07
Heart disease –1.29 0.2 –0.08 0.06
Musical talent 3.61 <.01 0.28 0.08
Sexual orientation –8.57 <.01 –0.76 0.09
Note: A negative t -statistic and mean difference indicate magnitude in the liberal
direction. Mean differences that are significant at the p < .01 level have been
bolded.
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8 List of Figures
All figures and supplementary figures are included in this section. While the supple-
mentary material was published originally as a separate file due to length constraints,
here it has been integrated into the manuscript and labeled accordingly.
Original material can be found at the following publication:
Willoughby, E. A., Love, A. C., McGue, M., Iacono, W. G., Quigley, J., and Lee,
James J. (2019). Behavior Genetics, 49 (2), 136–153. doi: 10.1007/s10519-018-9931-1
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8.1 Figure 1
Figure 1: Heat-map correlation matrix showing the patterns of intercorrelation that emerged among
lay estimates of genetic influence of 21 human traits.
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8.2 Figure 2
Figure 2: Scatterplot and associated regression line of mean lay estimates of genetic influence for
20 human traits (excepting colorblindness; converted from 1–5 Likert scale to 0–1 variance scale) in
Mechanical Turk sample of 1041 participants, along with published estimates of heritability for these
traits from meta-analyses and large-scale twin studies. The correspondence between lay estimates
and published estimates is r = .77 (r2 = .59). Points are color-coded to their group membership
according to the results of a four-factor solution of all responses.
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8.3 Figure 3
Figure 3: Comparison of absolute mean difference scores in accuracy of lay estimates of genetic
influence across surveyed human traits for men and women for those without children, one child,
and two or more children. These estimates represent the magnitude of distance between each partic-
ipant’s estimate and the published estimate on a 0 (only environmental factors) to 1 (only genetic
factors) scale. Lower mean distance (y-axis) therefore represents more accurate mean estimates
across all traits. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean, and sample size for each group
is displayed above each bar.
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8.4 Supplementary Figure 1
Supplementary Figure 1: Scree plot supporting retention of the first four components of a PCA
on 1041 participants’ estimates of the genetic influence on 21 human traits. Together these four
components account for 49% of the variance in these responses. A four-factor solution is supported
by parallel analysis (the generation of random data with the same mean and variance as in the
dataset produces the green regression line, above which factors can be considered meaningful), by
optimal coordinates (an extrapolation of the preceding eigenvalues by a red regression line between
the eigenvalue coordinates and the last eigenvalue coordinates), by the visual inspection of possible
acceleration points (location of the best “elbow”), by the consideration of eigenvalues above 1, and
by subjective conceptual identification of the factors (see text).
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8.5 Supplementary Figure 2
Supplementary Figure 2: Bar graph showing standardized factor score means on each of the four
trait factors (lifestyle, physical, psychiatric, and psychological), broken out by each of the five
possible locations on the political orientation item. The relatively small bars across the spectrum
for the lifestyle and physical trait factors indicate their relatively small correlations with political
orientation and of the individual traits that comprise them. The psychiatric and psychological trait
factors, by contrast, show distinct and opposite patterns across the political spectrum that are
consistent with the significant opposite–magnitude correlations between political orientation and
lay estimates for genetic influence on the traits that comprise these factors.
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8.6 Supplementary Figure 3
Supplementary Figure 3: Comparison of difference scores, represented by difference of surveyed lay
estimate of genetic influence on traits (converted to 0 to 1 scale) from the published estimate for
each surveyed trait. Positive values indicate overestimation of heritability of the trait in the MTurk
sample, and negative values indicate underestimation. The final column represents the mean of the
difference scores across all surveyed traits, indicating that the total sample slightly underrepresented
heritability. Error bars represent ± standard error of the mean.
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8.7 Supplementary Figure 4
Supplementary Figure 4: Scatterplot and regression lines for the mean lay estimates of genetic influ-
ence across 20 human traits by political orientation. The mean lay estimates across the 20 surveyed
traits of the 262 sampled conservatives (those who chose “very conservative” or “conservative”)
correlated with the published estimates at r = .81, while the mean judgments of those 512 partici-
pants identifying as “liberal” or “very liberal” correlated with the published estimates at r = .73.
The mean judgments of the 267 sampled moderates fell in between at r = .79. The relevance of this
difference is bolstered by breaking down those who identified as “very” liberal or conservative: The
172 “very liberal” participants had mean heritability judgments that correlated with the published
estimates at r = .70, whereas the “very conservative” participants showed r = .80.
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8.8 Supplementary Figure 5
Supplementary Figure 5: Lay estimates of genetic influence on traits for each political orientation
group compared to published heritability estimates for each trait. Means across all measured traits
were converted from the surveyed 1 to 5 scale to the 0 to 1 variance scale used in reporting measured
trait heritability from twin studies (where 0 = “only environmental factors” and 1 = “only genetic
factors”). The grey bar represents the published estimates of heritability for a given trait, as per
Table 8. Same size varied for each political group as follows (in parentheses): Red = very conservative
(63), pink = conservative (199), lavender = moderate (267), light blue = liberal (340), blue = very
liberal (172). Error bars represent ± standard error of the group mean.
